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Abstract—Machine Learning (ML) is an important enabler for
optimizing, securing and managing mobile networks. This leads
to increased collection and processing of data from network
functions, which in turn may increase threats to sensitive
end-user information. Consequently, mechanisms to reduce
threats to end-user privacy are needed to take full advantage of
ML. We seamlessly integrate Federated Learning (FL) into the
3GPP 5G Network Data Analytics (NWDA) architecture, and
add a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocol for protecting
the confidentiality of local updates. We evaluate the protocol
and find that it has much lower communication overhead than
previous work, without affecting ML performance.
Index Terms—5G, federated learning, machine learning,
security, privacy
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The 5th generation of mobile network technologies, 5G,
defines a new standard for Radio Access Network (RAN)
allowing billions of connected devices to transmit more data
than ever before. Due to the huge amount of data and devices,
complexity of configuring, managing and securing networks
increase. To meet these new demands, Machine Learning (ML)
is an important enabler [1].
In turn, data collection is necessary for ML. While data
collection leads to insights benefiting system optimization, it
can be sensitive in a privacy and a business sense, and may be
used for nefarious purposes. It is important to respect end users’
privacy as well as protecting business sensitive information
by considering privacy during the entire network lifecycle [2].
A. Motivation
The telecom industry is now considering collaborative ML
to improve privacy when using ML for network optimization,
time-series forecasting [3], predictive maintenance and QoE
modeling [4], [5].
Collaborative ML such as Federated Learning (FL) proposed
for mobile networks in [6], [7] avoids central collection of data
and instead perform training of an ML model locally where
the data is generated. The local updates generated by, e.g.,
base stations as in [3], are then aggregated by a parameter
server into a new global model. When FL is used, attackers
are therefore required to compromise each data generating
client individually to obtain its raw data. In this paper we
consider precisely these types of 5G use-cases based on a
single operator using FL in its own network.
NWDAF NF NRF OAM
A. Registration of support for FL service
B. Global model update subscription
Loop
C. Client selection
D. Local model update retrieval Models are trainedon each NF on
local data and
gradients sent
to NWDAF.
Initial model
weights are sent to
each registered NF.
E. Global model update
Fig. 1. An overview of our integration of Federated Learning (FL) in a 5G
Network Data Analytics (NWDA) context.
Details of how to realize collaborative learning in 5G
on a system architecture and protocol level has not been
investigated. Our scheme is therefore relevant for industry and
is timely as input for pre-standardization research.
B. Assets and Threats
We consider the problem of protecting raw data collected by
Network Functions (NFs) in 5G mobile networks for the purpose
of tuning their performance. An NF can be deployed at a base
station, which is a rich source of data that can be used to infer
network-wide insights [1]. Confidentiality of this data could be
lost if an NF is compromised. If the data is sent to a central
server such as Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF) for
ML model training, there is therefore an increased threat that for
example mobility patterns of an end-user leaks. Collecting data
also increases the risk that business sensitive information leaks,
such as system parameters. Consequently, the central server is a
more attractive target because it collects data from multiple NFs.
C. Our main contributions
We design and analyze a scheme which ensures that updates
from FL clients are aggregated in a privacy preserving fashion
using Multi-Party Computation (MPC). We show how this
scheme can be integrated in the 5G Network Data Analytics
(NWDA) framework [8], [9] and protocols without breaking the
structure of the architecture or its underlying principles. Specif-
ically, we consider the following to be our main contributions:
1. An integration of collaborative learning (in particular Fed-
erated Learning (FL) [6]) into the 5G NWDA framework;
2. A privacy-enhancing and efficient scheme for collaborative
learning algorithms in the 5G NWDA inspired by Bonawitz
et al. [10];
3. An evaluation of the scheme with respect to communication
cost, storage cost and computational cost.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. 3GPP 5G Service Based Architecture
The 3GPP created a new framework for core network
protocols for 5G called Service Based Architecture (SBA) [11].
1) Architecture and Principles: SBA comprises NFs that
expose services through RESTful APIs [12]. NFs can invoke
services in other NFs via these APIs. To be discoverable to
service consumers, service producers must register with an NF
Repository Function (NRF) [13]. Upon request from an NF,
the NRF responds with a list of identifiers for suitable service
producers, which can fulfill the service criteria posed by the
NF. The NF may for example request a list of all service
producers of a certain type.
2) Security: SBA builds security in from the start [14]
so that access to any API of an NF is authenticated and
authorized. Sensitive data transmitted between providers and
consumers is further confidentiality and integrity protected.
Operators control a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) managing
certificates for all NFs. Our scheme makes use of this PKI
and does not depend on any of the authorization features and
we assume that all requests are authorized according to an
appropriate policy.
B. 3GPP 5G Analytics framework
For analytics and predictions, 5G provides harmonized
mechanisms for data collection. These mechanisms are
based on a consumer and producer concept realized by SBA
communication patterns and form the framework called
NWDA [9]. NWDA is centered around a function named
NWDAF that serves two main purposes. First, it acts as a service
consumer, collecting data using Data Collection procedures from
NFs, who act as service providers. Second, it processes the data
and provides analytics and predictions as a service provider to
other NFs using Analytics and Prediction Exposure procedures.
C. Improving privacy with collaborative learning
Use-cases relevant for 5G, listed in Section I-A, encompasses
FL tasks such as time-series forecasting for predictive
maintenance, or classification for traffic management and QoE
modeling. These tasks revolve around a neural network model
that is parameterized by weights. We therefore consider neural
networks, with weights serialized into a vector w∈Rd, where
d is the length of the vector.
In geographically distributed collaborative learning
frameworks, the data belongs to and is local to each NF.
The collaborative learning approach FL [6] minimizes
objective functions over a set of geographically distributed
clients. Training is done synchronously, and a parameter server
coordinates the training during a number of training rounds.
In training round t, each NFk will train locally on nk samples
before a local model update w(k,t) is sent to the NWDAF. The
NWDAF performs aggregation of all received local updates
and distributes the global model to all NFs.
III. INTEGRATING
FEDERATED LEARNING IN THE ANALYTICS FRAMEWORK
In this section we present our first main contribution —
an integration of collaborative learning, specifically FL, into
the 5G NWDA framework.
The NFs trust the NWDAF to faithfully compute the joint
model update of the participating NFs individual updates.
They would however like to reduce the risk that the NWDAF
gets direct access to the raw local data.
The NWDAF may try to insert, delete or modify messages
sent between NFs. Because SBA provides confidentiality and
integrity protection of messages, NFs or other parties cannot
interfere or eavesdrop on the communication between NFs
and the NWDAF. This is the trust model we use.
To integrate FL into the NWDA framework, we first split
it into five phases, as seen in Fig. 1. We consider the client
from [6] as a component of an NF and the parameter server
as a component of a NWDAF.
A. Registration of support for Federated Learning service
An NF may provide the SBA service to train an ML model
on local data and send model updates to a subscriber of that
service. The model updates are sent as events using the Data
Collection procedures defined in [9]. We refer to these updates
as local model updates. The NWDAF is the intended consumer
for these services.
During the registration of the ML training SBA service, an
NF informs the NRF about supported features related to model
training. The NF can for example indicate the current traffic
load, if it has a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) or which
types of models it can train.
B. Global model update subscription
An NWDAF provides the NWDA analytics service of
sending global model updates to NFs. NFs interested in global
model updates need to subscribe to them. It is not required
that a consuming NF also makes itself available as a training
service provider, but we will assume that this is the case.
Therefore, NFs that have subscribed to global model updates,
K such clients, are available for selection.
C. Client selection
A necessary part of FL is to select a subset of clients in
each training round. It is common to use a random subset of
all clients. This can be suboptimal in the context of 5G where
it can, for example, introduce bias and unfairness [1], [15].
FL algorithms define parameters controlling their behaviors,
such as the fraction C of NFs selected for training in each
round. We denote the set of selected NFs LS and the number
of selected NFs Ks= |LS|=dCKe and note that the selection
strategy does not impact the security of our scheme. In each
training round, the NWDAF performs client selection by
running a Discovery Request procedure with the NRF [13]. We
enhance client selection in NWDA by allowing the NWDAF
to decide the selection strategy and to select NFs by using
metadata (see Section III-A) or Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs) via the NWDA Data Collection procedure [9].
D. Local model update retrieval
We integrate sending the local updates with the NWDA
analytics subscribe pattern [9]. In this way the NWDAF can
trigger the NF to start training of the ML model on local data.
When the training is complete, the NF sends the local model
update to the NWDAF.
E. Global model update
The NWDAF will aggregate all retrieved local model updates
and update the global model. The updated global model is
sent to NFs that registered to receive global model updates.
Aggregation of the local model updates is done using a
weighted average. The weights depends on the number of local
datapoints used in the training round and therefore the local
model update also need to contain the number of datapoints.
NFs can stop receiving global model updates from the
NWDAF by using the analytics unsubscribe procedure [9],
for example when the ML performance of the global model
is sufficiently good.
IV. IMPROVING PRIVACY FURTHER USING MPC
In this section we present our second main contribution — a
privacy-enhancing scheme for FL in the 5G NWDA framework
inspired by [10].
A. Residual threats
Even when FL is used, observers may learn sensitive
information from the updates themselves. That is, NFs should
not reveal their local updates to the NWDAF, nor to other NFs or
other parties. Furthermore, FL introduces a new type of sensitive
data into the system — the number of datapoints used by each
NF. This may leak information about the actual data. Therefore,
our scheme also protects the number of datapoints of each NF.
Our scheme ensures that even if NFs collude with the
NWDAF to reveal the update of another NF, they will fail.
It is still possible that some property of the inputs is
deducible solely from the output of the computation, i.e., the
global ML model [16], [17].
B. Privacy Through Multi-Party Computation
Our protocol consists of two parts, Session Initialization and
Aggregation. The first part establishes a session and pair-wise
shared secrets between the NFs, and the second executes the
aggregation of local updates throughout a number of training
rounds. The local updates are protected by masks derived from
the pair-wise shared secrets. An example of our scheme with
two NFs is depicted in Fig. 2.
1) Preliminaries: Session participants are an NWDAF and
a set of NFs that we refer to as the total population. The total
population is ordered according to some total order determined
by the NWDAF, which remains fixed throughout the session.
When we refer to the position of an NF, it is w.r.t. this order.
We assume that the PLMN operator maintains a PKI,
in which all NFs are enrolled. The NFs are identified by
their hostnames, which are unique within the PKI, and their
private/public key pair represent their identity. All participants
NWDAF NF0 NF1 PKI
Session Initialization
Key Setup Request (1,LS)
1.
1,[{gx1,0 ,Pos(NF0),Pos(NF1)}]
2. (2,{gx1,0 ,Pos(NF0),Pos(NF1)})
Forward
2.
2,[{gy1,0 ,SIG0(gx0,1 ,gy1,0),MACK(Pos(NF0))}]
3.
3,{gy1,0 ,SIG0(gx0,1 ,gy1,0),MACK(Pos(NF0))}
Forward
Key for NF0?
Pub NF03.
3,[{SIG1(gx0,1 ,gy1,0),MACK(Pos(NF1))}]
4.
4,{SIG1(gx0,1 ,gy1,0),MACK(Pos(NF1))}
Forward
Key for NF1?
Pub NF1
Aggregation
MPC Input Request (t)
MPC Input Response ( −m(0,1)+v1)
MPC Input Request (t)
MPC Input Response ( m(0,1)+v0)
Fig. 2. An overview of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) in Federated Learning
(FL) context. In this example only two NFs are selected. The NWDAF
instructs NF1 to initiate a key exchange with all NFs with lower position, in
this case only NF0. Following the session initialization we run an aggregation
where the constructed mask m(0,1) is added by NF0 and subtracted by NF1.
The key K is derived from the Diffie-Hellman secret using a PRF and is part
of SIGMA. A list is denoted by brackets, and a container with curly brackets.
have access to a fixed secure PRF and a fixed secure Pseudo
Random Generator (PRG) to compute the pair-wise shared
secrets and masks, see Fig. 2.
2) Session Initialization: The purpose of session
initialization is to establish initialized session states in the
NWDAF and all the NFs in the total population. The procedure
is point-to-point between the NWDAF and an NF and follows a
request/response pattern according to [12, Section 4.6.1]. The
procedure tunnels SIGMA key establishment [18] messages
between NFs via the NWDAF. SIGMA establishes pair-wise
shared secrets between NFs. We allow caching of the pair-wise
shared secrets between sessions. A training round sequence
number t ensures fresh masks for each training round, even
when a pair-wise shared secret from a previous session is
re-used. The NWDAF sets t to zero at the start of the session
and increases it by one for each round. NFs keep their own local
replay counter tNF, and abort if the NWDAF attempts to re-use
a lower value for t. The NWDAF sends the first message Key
Setup Request to all selected NFs, which includes the list LS.
An NFk acts as initiator of the SIGMA protocol execution if it
has a lower position than another NF. For each NFi, where i>k,
NFk creates a container that includes its first SIGMA message.
The NWDAF collects responses from all NFs, before
forwarding the containers, in batch, to the correct NF, based
on the addresses on the containers. When an NF, say NFk,
receives a list of containers, it creates the corresponding
SIGMA response messages, packs them into containers and
returns them to the NWDAF. The remaining two SIGMA
messages are exchanged similarly.
On completion of SIGMA, the session initialization is
considered ready. At this point, all pairs of NFs, NFk and NFk′ ,
share a secret DHk,k′ and associate the highest seen training
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+
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Fig. 3. The 4 selected NFs each add masks for every other NF. The cancellation
of masks m(0,2)= and m(1,3)= are indicated by the arrows. Each
mask above the diagonal is canceled out by a mask below the diagonal. The
cancellations of masks do not affect the sum, so
∑3
i=0w
∗
(i,t)
=
∑3
i=0w(i,t).
round sequence number with this Diffie-Hellman secret.
3) Aggregation: Local updates are hidden from the NWDAF
using masks, which are shared using the secret sharing scheme
in Section IV-B2. The masks cancel each other out during the
execution of a secure sum protocol, which is an optimization
of [19, Protocol 1]. Each NF masks their local updates by
independently and randomly sample masks from ZdR for some
suitable R, where d is the length of the local update. R must be
larger than any component of w(k,t), when the component is in-
terpreted as an unsigned integer. The purpose of R is to constrain
the maximum size of components in the masked local update.
The masks are combined with the local update w(k,t)
by component-wise integer addition modulo R, where the
components are considered as some fixed integer encoding
of their respective real-value.
The inverse is the component-wise additive inverse modulo R.
Finding the inverse of a mask is trivial for someone who
knows the mask and infeasible for anyone else since masks are
selected uniformly at random and are independent. Essentially,
masking is encryption with a one-time pseudo-random pad.
Local updates can be large, therefore, so can masks. To
reduce communication overhead, we use an idea similar to [10],
where masks are generated from the pair-wise secret shared
between the NF adding the mask and the one canceling it.
Consider masks as vectors of unsigned integers and let the
position of an NF be k. NFk hides its local update w(k,t) by
adding all masks m(k,i) to it where k<i, and subtracting all
masks m(k,i) from it where k>i. The masked version w∗(k,t)
of the local update is
w∗(k,t)=nk ·w(k,t)+
∑
i∈LS,
k<i
m(k,i)−
∑
i∈LS,
k>i
m(i,k),
where nk is the number of datapoints for NFk used in training
round t, see Fig. 3 for a visual representation of this.
As a last step, NFk generates a separate set of masks to
hide the number of datapoints used for training. These masks
are added and subtracted in the same way as the masks for the
local updates, and the NWDAF adds them together and uses
the result to scale the sum by the total number of points n
used during this training round. This protects the number of
datapoints, which would otherwise potentially reveal sensitive
information about the local data.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we present our third main contribution —
an evaluation of the proposed privacy-preserving scheme for
FL in 5G NWDA. An argument for the security of the scheme
can be found in Appendix A.
A. Setting
Security protocols add overhead, and it is important to keep
the ratio between security overhead and protected data low.
5G datasets can be sensitive in a business sense so real
associated models are therefore also unpublished which makes
it difficult to obtain and use such a model for our analysis.
Therefore, in Fig. 6, as a reading guide for this section we
provide a visual representation of the operating point (in terms of
number of NFs and model size) for some use-cases. We consider
the case where NFs are base stations deployed for one operator
and provide the estimated number of NFs based on the number of
deployed 4G base stations for a small and a large operator [20].
The size of the ML model depends on the use-case, from
very small models in [3] to larger models. As use-cases
become more complex, and as the volume of data generated
increases, the needed size of models will also increase. We
expect the operating point for future 5G use-cases to end up
in the green area seen in Fig. 6.
B. Communication cost
We use a communication cost metric where we include
the total number of bytes transmitted both in uplink and in
downlink. Note that the lower layer protocol overhead, from
for example HTTP/2 and TLS, is not included in our analysis.
1) Session initialization: security related communication:
a) First round: In Fig. 2 we see an overview of the
messages in the Session Initialization. The NWDAF sends a
list of hostnames LS to each of the selected Ks NFs. Each
NF will respond to this message with a list of transparent
containers, one for each NF that has a lower index than the
initiating NF, in total
(
Ks
2
)
such containers. In this way, we
calculate the total communication cost of messages in session
initialization and compare between the session initialization
and aggregation communication cost in Fig. 4.
b) Subsequent training rounds: The probability that se-
lected NFs, NFi and NFj , need to exchange secrets in round t is
PNFi key exchange with NFj =
(
1−Ks
K
[
Ks−1
K−1
])t
.
As t goes to infinity, this probability goes to 0, as seen
in Fig. 5 where the communication cost growth for the session
initialization drops off. Note that an NF may already have a
certificate of another NF that it obtained for some other reason.
Communication cost in the session initialization is O(K2s ).
Note that this cost is heavily influenced by the size of the
hostname list. Each NF is assigned a 12B globally unique
identifier [22]. Adding a domain name, the hostnames we
use are 30B of the form gNB-382A3F47.myran.example.com.
Other security parameters are chosen to match 128 bit security.
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2) Aggregation: ML model related communication: In each
training round each selected NF sends a local model update to
the NWDAF, see Fig. 1. The NWDAF performs aggregation and
sends the updated global model to all registered NFs. The total
cost of sending the model of size d in this step depends on K
and on Ks. Each NF has a communication cost of O(d), so the
total aggregation communication cost in each round is O(dK).
3) Protocol overhead: We compare the total size of all
security related messages and model related messages to the
protocol without security, i.e. standard FL. We call this overhead
DEF. The DEF from security related messages increases with
increasing number of NFs. We expect future FL use-cases in
5G to require large models and relatively small number of NFs.
In Fig. 7 we compare the DEF of our scheme to that of [10]
in their fully malicious case. This comparison is done for the
cases where the number of NFs match the number of base
stations from a small and large operators. We vary the model
size. As seen in Fig. 5 the DEF for our scheme is reduced with
increasing t. In Fig. 7 we plot the DEF for our scheme when
all NFs have been selected at least once — there is a similar
but much small effect for [10] but this is omitted for clarity.
C. Computation cost
1) Session initialization computation: Each NF will at most
need to do Ks−1 key establishments in one training round
and need to expand the seed to a full mask for every other
NF. The mask length depends on the model size. The resulting
session initialization computation cost per NF is O(Ksd).
The session initialization computation cost for the NWDAF
depends on the number of selected NFs Ks, and is O(Ks).
2) Aggregation computation: The NWDAF is unaware of
any masks, and simply performs aggregation of Ks local model
updates. The resulting session initialization computation cost
for the NWDAF is O(Ksd). The ML computation costs for
an NF (training and inference) are out of scope of this paper.
D. Storage costs
1) Session initialization storage: The largest storage needed
is for K − 1 session keys, K certificates, K hostnames,
1 private key and 1 training round sequence number. We
can trade storage for communication by only storing the
certificates and session keys for the NFs that are selected in
the current training round. The storage needed in this case
then depends on Ks. The storage needed for the NWDAF is
for K hostnames and 1 training round sequence number.
2) Aggregation storage: Each participating NF need to
store the global model, not counting temporary storage needed
during training. The model related storage for each NF is O(d)
and the state related storage is O (Ks). The model related
storage for the NWDAF is O(d).
VI. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
A. Related Work
Our scheme is inspired by Bonawitz et al. [7] in which the
authors discuss a practical implementation of FL including
security. Their security aspects are further developed in [10].
They target mobile devices with no pre-established security
relations and where group membership is volatile. They
overcome this volatility by additional functionality in their
scheme. However, as we assume that NFs will have a
much lower drop rate than mobile phones, we avoid their
robustness-improving additions. We also make use of the
fact that NFs already are part of a common PKI to reduce
complexity. This excludes use-cases with more than one mobile
operator, such as [4], [5], and we leave this as future work.
A parameter server may detect malicious or malfunctioning
clients based on the information in the local updates.
[23] implements a robust Byzantine-resilient aggregation
method. Unfortunately, such methods fail when MPC is used,
because they need access to the local updates of the FL clients.
[24] proposed to encrypt local updates using Paillier
homomorphic cryptosystem which can be more efficient in the
initialization phase, but don’t evaluate this. They show that pa-
rameter server complexity increases, and that ML performance is
lower. They do not embed their protocol in any particular system.
Although MPC is applied, the global model may leak infor-
mation. Differential privacy could be used, but those schemes
need further work before they can be practically applied [15].
VII. CONCLUSION
ML is becoming an essential technology for optimizing
mobile networks. This has lead to an increased collection
and processing of data that may leak sensitive information.
Consequently, mechanisms to protect the business sensitive
information and end-users’ privacy are needed.
We devised a scheme for end-user privacy protection
and demonstrated how to integrate it in the 5G SBA and
NWDA architecture. The scheme was evaluated in terms
of computational and communication cost. We explore the
security of our scheme in [25, Appendix A].
We found that the communication overhead, DEF, depends
on the client fraction C, the size of the ML model, the number
of NFs and the training round t. For the use-cases we envision,
as well as for potential future use-cases, we showed that the
overhead of our scheme is smaller than that of [10]. Our gain
stemmed from relaxed reliability constraints and re-use of
existing telecom infrastructure, such as PKI. However, we
see an opportunity to further improve our scheme in terms
of communication overhead and to use our NWDA integration
to improve bias and fairness.
Even though it is known that sensitive information may still
leak even when FL and MPC are properly applied, our scheme
significantly improves privacy. Because it is available and
much simpler to apply in practice, in comparison to differential
privacy, we believe it would be beneficial to deploy a scheme
such as ours.
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APPENDIX
A. Security justification
Although we have explained the security purpose for
introducing functionality throughout the paper, we now give a
brief argument for the security of the compound scheme. The
correctness of the protocol can be seen from the description of
the protocol itself above, and we will not consider it further.
The security goal of the scheme is to ensure that the
NWDAF only knows its own input to the computation and the
final result, i.e., the updated model. The initialization phase
is run once and the masked-based secure sum protocol is run
each round to compute a new updated model. Our argument
that this is secure can be divided into the following two claims.
Claim 1: The mask-based secure sum protocol fulfills the
security goal assuming the masks are uniformly and randomly
selected and assuming each pair of NFs share a mask and
its inverse (we call these two pair-wise masks below), known
only to that NF-pair.
Claim 2: The masks are uniformly and randomly selected
in each round assuming SIGMA is a secure key establishment
protocol, that the PRF, PRG, signature scheme and MAC are
secure according to standard definitions.
To justify Claim 1 we argue as follows. For each other NF,
an NF adds the mask it shares with that NF to the local update
(or the inverse of the mask depending on their relative positions
in the NF order). Adding a uniformly random mask to a local
update using modular addition results in a uniform distribution.
No-one except that pair of NFs can hence distinguish the masked
local update from a random value. For each pair of NFs, the NF
adds a mask known only to that pair. This means that given the
total sum of all the masks and the local update contains at least
|LS|−2 masks not known to any given NF. Consequently, at
least |LS|−2 need to collude to unmask a masked local update.
Adding two masked local updates together will provide the sum
of those local updates still masked by the remaining masks. As
long as at least one mask remains in the sum, the sum cannot
be unconcealed. Once all local updates are added together, the
result is their sum and all masks are canceled. At this point the
NWDAF knows the output of the computation, but has not been
able to unconceal any of the inputs, which is what we claimed.
To justify Claim 2 we argue as follows. In the initialization
phase, each NF establishes a pair-wise secret with each other
NF using the SIGMA key establishment protocol. Further,
the signature scheme, MAC and MAC-key generation via
the PRF, on which SIGMA relies, are secure by assumption.
SIGMA is secure in the CK-model [18], meaning that the
established shared secret is indistinguishable from a randomly
selected element from the underlying Diffie-Hellman group.
We can therefore assume that the pair-wise shared secret is
indistinguishable from random to anyone else than the pair
of NFs and that it is mutually authenticated.
In each round, each NF verifies that t has not been used
earlier, and we therefore can assume it is fresh for all NFs
in all runs of the protocol. For simplicity, we assume that an
NF that detects a re-used t value stops execution, at which
point the entire round of the protocol fails to execute. Note
that even in that case, only NFs which obtain a fresh t value
would continue execution, so all NFs can be assumed to use
a fresh t value to generate output in the protocol.
The pair-wise masks are generated from the pair-wise shared
secret, which may be the same for more than one training
round. However, the value t, which is guaranteed to be fresh for
each training round, is also used as input to the mask-generating
PRG. Because the PRG is secure, its output is indistinguishable
from a uniformly randomly selected string given that the input
gxy obtained from SIGMA is secret. To conclude, because t is
fresh, the pair-wise masks are uniformly random, known only
to the NF-pair, and they are secret and fresh for each round.
We note that the order of the NFs affects two aspects. First,
the order determines which NF acts as initiator and which one
acts as responder for the SIGMA exchange between each pair.
SIGMA is secure regardless which part takes which role, and
no NF will continue execution of the scheme unless it has
run SIGMA with each NF in the order. So, the NWDAF does
not gain anything by selecting a certain order in this respect.
Second, the order determines which NF computes a mask
and which NF computes the inverse of a mask. By the
symmetry of the masks, it is irrelevant which NF generates
the mask. Since no NF will continue execution unless it has
a pair-wise mask with all other NFs in the pair, the NWDAF
gain nothing by selecting a certain order.
The secure sum protocol is considered meeting the security
goal even in the degenerate case where the |LS|=1. In that
case, the NWDAF would in fact learn the local update of the
single participating NF. This can be prevented by adding a
rule in the scheme that NFs shall terminate the execution if
the size LS is less than some threshold value. It may be useful
to set this threshold to a larger value than one to reduce the
effects of outliers.
